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ARXIV:2604.01350 · LLM AGENTS · SUBMITTED 03 APR · 20:19 UTC · FRESHNESS STALE
ARXIV:2604.01350LLM AGENTSSUBMITTED 03 APR · 20:19 UTCFRESHNESS STALETiankai Yang · Jiate Li · Yi Nian · Shen Dong · Ruiyao Xu · Ryan Rossi · +2 at arXiv
This research identifies and quantifies a critical security flaw in shared-state LLM agents where benign user interactions can unintentionally corrupt outcomes for other users, requiring new artifact-level defenses.
Opportunity summary
Pain This research identifies and quantifies a critical security flaw in shared-state LLM agents where benign user interactions can unintentionally corrupt outcomes for other users, requiring new artifact-level defenses.
Evidence 0 refs | 0 sources | 17% coverage
Blocker Evidence unverified
This research identifies and quantifies a critical security flaw in shared-state LLM agents where benign user interactions can unintentionally corrupt outcomes for other users, requiring new artifact-level defenses. In many deployments, a single agent…
LLM-based agents increasingly operate across repeated sessions, maintaining task states to ensure continuity. In many deployments, a single agent serves multiple users within a team or organization, reusing a shared knowledge layer across user…
ScienceToStartup currently rates this 4.0/10 on the public viability pass. These results indicate that shared-state agents need artifact-level defenses beyond text-level sanitization to prevent silent cross-user failures.
LLM Agents moved forward this cycle; last verified April 2026. Public score 4.0/10.
Continue into Read for claims, analysis, references, and neighboring papers.
mobile layout uses overflow-hidden min-w-0 break-wordsOpportunity summary
Score4.0Public score shown from the verified overall while the stale axis breakdown refreshesAnalysis summary
This research identifies and quantifies a critical security flaw in shared-state LLM agents where benign user interactions can unintentionally corrupt outcomes for other users, requiring new artifact-level defenses.
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Paper Pack
10.48550/arXiv.2604.01350This research identifies and quantifies a critical security flaw in shared-state LLM agents where benign user interactions can unintentionally corrupt outcomes for other users, requiring new artifact-level defenses.
Abstract
LLM-based agents increasingly operate across repeated sessions, maintaining task states to ensure continuity. In many deployments, a single agent serves multiple users within a team or organization, reusing a shared knowledge layer across user identities. This shared persistence expands the failure surface: information that is locally valid for one user can silently degrade another user's outcome when the agent reapplies it without regard for scope. We refer to this failure mode as unintentional cross-user contamination (UCC). Unlike adversarial memory poisoning, UCC requires no attacker; it arises from benign interactions whose scope-bound artifacts persist and are later misapplied. We formalize UCC through a controlled evaluation protocol, introduce a taxonomy of three contamination types, and evaluate the problem in two shared-state mechanisms. Under raw shared state, benign interactions alone produce contamination rates of 57--71%. A write-time sanitization is effective when shared state is conversational, but leaves substantial residual risk when shared state includes executable artifacts, with contamination often manifesting as silent wrong answers. These results indicate that shared-state agents need artifact-level defenses beyond text-level sanitization to prevent silent cross-user failures.
Source availability
PDF linkedThe paper record includes a public PDF URL.
Extraction status
Derived fallbackRead summaries are estimated from adjacent metadata, not verified extraction rows.
Proof status
unverified0 refs; 0 sources; 17% coverage.
What was readable
Derived fallback: Estimated from adjacent evidence; not verified from source.
Viability
Time to MVP
Commercial
Export
Preparing verified analysis
Dimensions overall score 4.0
PROBLEM
This research identifies and quantifies a critical security flaw in shared-state LLM agents where benign user interactions can unintentionally corrupt outcomes for other users, requiring new artifact-level defenses. In many deployments, a single agent serves multiple users withi...
METHOD
LLM-based agents increasingly operate across repeated sessions, maintaining task states to ensure continuity. In many deployments, a single agent serves multiple users within a team or organization, reusing a shared knowledge layer across user identities.
RESULT
ScienceToStartup currently rates this 4.0/10 on the public viability pass. These results indicate that shared-state agents need artifact-level defenses beyond text-level sanitization to prevent silent cross-user failures.
WHY NOW
LLM Agents moved forward this cycle; last verified April 2026. Public score 4.0/10.
Abstract-backed public claims while anchored extraction refreshes.
This research identifies and quantifies a critical security flaw in shared-state LLM agents where benign user interactions can unintentionally corrupt outcomes for other users, requiring new artifact-level defenses. In many deployments, a single agent serves multiple users within a team or organization, reusing a shared knowledge layer across user identities.
Abstract-backed fallback claim; anchored extraction has not materialized a public claim row yet.
partial
LLM-based agents increasingly operate across repeated sessions, maintaining task states to ensure continuity. In many deployments, a single agent serves multiple users within a team or organization, reusing a shared knowledge layer across user identities.
Abstract-backed fallback claim; anchored extraction has not materialized a public claim row yet.
partial
ScienceToStartup currently rates this 4.0/10 on the public viability pass. These results indicate that shared-state agents need artifact-level defenses beyond text-level sanitization to prevent silent cross-user failures.
Abstract-backed fallback claim; anchored extraction has not materialized a public claim row yet.
partial
LLM Agents moved forward this cycle; last verified April 2026. Public score 4.0/10.
Abstract-backed fallback claim; anchored extraction has not materialized a public claim row yet.
partial
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Concepts
Methods
Materials
Markets
Competitors
This research identifies and quantifies a critical security flaw in shared-state LLM agents where benign user interactions can unintentionally corrupt outcomes for other users, requiring new artifact-level defenses.
Segment
LLM Agents
Adoption evidence
No public code link in the paper record yet
Commercial read
4.0/10 public viability
Direct
Adjacent
Substitute
Unknown
No indexed public discussion is attached to 2604.01350 yet. That is a visibility signal, not a blank module: the monitor is watching the public channels below.
Hacker News
Not indexed yet
Not indexed yet
Bluesky
Not indexed yet
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Reference metadata is not materialized in the public index yet. The source PDF remains the authority; cache refresh is optional.
CITED BY
No citing papers are indexed in the public S2S graph yet. This is an explicit zero-signal state, not a hidden lookup.
Foundation
Extension
Commercially relevant
Conflicting
Owned Distribution
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0/3 checks · 0%
Build Passport
Build passport pending - Proof Lab budget No verified cost estimate / $7.00 cap
status
missing
reason
passport_row_missing
proof status
unverified
cost/budget
No verified cost estimate
confidence low
next verification path
Build brief missing until Build Passport data exists.
Source missing: Build Passport payload.
Experiment plan missing until prototype path is available.
No prototype path attached.
Validation checklist missing until required assets, cost, and regulatory flags are verified.
No checklist artifact is attached to the Build Passport payload.
Derived signals show verified:false until source-backed receipts exist.
Evidence coverage
OpportunityKernel evidence_receipt
0 refs / 0 sources / 17% coverage
stale
Verify missing sources before using this as buyer proof. verified:false
Build readiness
BuildPassport EvidenceState
passport absent
stale
Run Proof Lab or inspect typed missing state. verified:false
Artifact maturity
GitHub and Hugging Face maturity payloads
No public artifact surface observed
stale
Open source artifacts or mark the gap as missing. verified:false
Technical feasibility
partial
Current read
Runnable path is not fully verified.
Evidence
No Build Passport payload attached.
Gaps
Next test
Run minimal reproduction from the Build Passport prototype path.
Market urgency
missing
Current read
Buyer urgency is not verified from source.
Evidence
0 references, 0 sources, 17% evidence coverage.
Gaps
Next test
Collect buyer interview, deployment evidence, or cited demand signal.
Buyer clarity
missing
Current read
No budget owner is verified for this paper.
Evidence
Build tab has no CRM, procurement, or operator source.
Gaps
Next test
Map target operator, economic buyer, and procurement trigger.
Defensibility
missing
Current read
Defensibility signals are missing.
Evidence
No defensibility receipt attached.
Gaps
Next test
Refresh defensibility bars with source receipts.
Integration burden
missing
Current read
No public implementation surface observed.
Evidence
No GitHub or Hugging Face payload attached.
Gaps
Next test
Write integration checklist from prototype path and target workflow.
Capital intensity
missing
Current read
No observed cost estimate is verified.
Evidence
Cost passport has no observed_usd value.
Gaps
Next test
Run cost passport or mark the cost field not applicable.
Regulatory load
missing
Current read
No regulatory classification is attached.
Evidence
Build Passport ledger does not include regulatory flags.
Gaps
Next test
Classify regulatory flags before commercialization planning.
No named scientific founder assigned.
Paper authors are not treated as operators without consent.
People
No named person assigned.
Gaps
Next verification path
Prototype owner missing.
Build Passport does not name an implementer.
People
No named person assigned.
Gaps
Next verification path
Operator workflow not sourced.
No buyer or workflow interview attached.
People
No named person assigned.
Gaps
Next verification path
No GTM owner verified.
No CRM or outreach source attached.
People
No named person assigned.
Gaps
Next verification path
Regulatory need unclassified.
No clinical or regulatory source attached.
People
No named person assigned.
Gaps
Next verification path
ARTIFACTS
No public artifacts yet.
DEFENSIBILITY
Defensibility and confidence evidence pending.
WATCHTOWER
No verified watchtower monitor rows yet.
FORESIGHT
No prediction yet — minted on next Foresight batch.
OPPORTUNITYKERNEL CHANGES SINCE LAST VIEW
No verified OpportunityKernel changes since the last view.
COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE UPDATES
No verified competitive landscape changes yet.
RELATED PAPER UPDATES
No verified related paper changes yet.
SIGNAL CANVAS HISTORY AND DELTAS
No Signal Canvas history deltas yet.
TIMELINE
Save this paper to start tracking momentum - commits, demos, and score changes appear here.
No tracked events yet.
Score trend will appear after multiple data points.
BUZZ
Buzz trend pending.