proof blockPage 168%
This equation captures one of the core mathematical components of the system. each item is sold in an independent auction. Each agent has a private function vi : [0, 1]m →R≥
Page and bbox are available; crop image is pending.
Efficiency of Proportional Mechanisms in Online Auto-Bidding Advertising explores This paper analyzes the efficiency of proportional mechanisms in online advertising auto-bidding, proposing a modified mechanism with improved price of anarchy bounds. in Algorithmic Game Theory.
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Page Freshness
Canonical route: /paper/efficiency-of-proportional-mechanisms-in-online-auto-bidding-advertising
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Agent Handoff
Canonical ID efficiency-of-proportional-mechanisms-in-online-auto-bidding-advertising | Route /paper/efficiency-of-proportional-mechanisms-in-online-auto-bidding-advertising
REST example
curl https://sciencetostartup.com/api/v1/agent-handoff/paper/efficiency-of-proportional-mechanisms-in-online-auto-bidding-advertisingMCP example
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}Paper proof page receipt window
/buildability/efficiency-of-proportional-mechanisms-in-online-auto-bidding-advertising
Subject: Efficiency of Proportional Mechanisms in Online Auto-Bidding Advertising
Verdict
Ignore
Verdict is Ignore because current viability and proof state do not clear the buildability gate.
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Insufficient data
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Insufficient data
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This equation captures one of the core mathematical components of the system. each item is sold in an independent auction. Each agent has a private function vi : [0, 1]m →R≥
Page and bbox are available; crop image is pending.
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Receipt path
/buildability/efficiency-of-proportional-mechanisms-in-online-auto-bidding-advertising
Paper ref
efficiency-of-proportional-mechanisms-in-online-auto-bidding-advertising
arXiv id
2604.12799
Generated at
2026-04-15T17:02:33.832Z
Evidence freshness
stale
Last verification
2026-04-15T17:02:33.832Z
Sources
3
References
0
Coverage
50%
Lineage hash
0def1dfaee6b4ca99f68c450820bad008a1ac3b5853513903a71703da7addf5f
Canonical opportunity-kernel lineage hash.
External signature
unsigned_external
No founder, registry, pilot, or production-adoption signature is attached to this receipt.
Verification
not_verified
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Pending verification refs / 3 sources / Verification pending
repo_url
references
This equation captures one of the core mathematical components of the system. mits a bid bij ∈R≥0. After collecting all bids b1j, . . . , bnj on item j, the auctioneer determines the
Page and bbox are available; crop image is pending.
This equation captures one of the core mathematical components of the system. j=1 vijdij where vij ∈R≥0 represents the value agent i derives from fully acquiring item
Page and bbox are available; crop image is pending.
No public competitor map is available for this paper yet.