Opportunity summary
Score0.0Public score shown from the verified overall while the stale axis breakdown refreshesThis canonical paper page includes Commercialization Proof and Related Resources.
ARXIV:2606.09549 · UNCATEGORIZED · SUBMITTED 09 JUN · 03:24 UTC · FRESHNESS FRESH
ARXIV:2606.09549UNCATEGORIZEDSUBMITTED 09 JUN · 03:24 UTCFRESHNESS FRESHYuhan Ma · Stefan Schmid · arXiv
ScienceToStartup currently rates this 0.0/10 on the public viability pass. Across AgentDojo, AgentLeak, and Agent Security Bench (ASB), SecureClaw is the only defense we evaluate in a common harness that…
Opportunity summary
Pain customer pain not on file
Evidence 0 refs | 3 sources | 50% coverage
Blocker Evidence unverified
Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents face two distinct security failures: unauthorized external actions and exposure of sensitive plaintext inside the runtime before any final output check can intervene.
Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents face two distinct security failures: unauthorized external actions and exposure of sensitive plaintext inside the runtime before any final output check can intervene. Existing defenses usually protect one…
ScienceToStartup currently rates this 0.0/10 on the public viability pass. Across AgentDojo, AgentLeak, and Agent Security Bench (ASB), SecureClaw is the only defense we evaluate in a common harness that simultaneously retains usable task…
Uncategorized moved forward this cycle; last verified June 2026. Public score 0.0/10.
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mobile layout uses overflow-hidden min-w-0 break-wordsOpportunity summary
Score0.0Public score shown from the verified overall while the stale axis breakdown refreshesAnalysis summary
ScienceToStartup currently rates this 0.0/10 on the public viability pass. Across AgentDojo, AgentLeak, and Agent Security Bench (ASB), SecureClaw is the only defense we evaluate in a common harness that…
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Paper Pack
10.48550/arXiv.2606.09549Abstract
Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents face two distinct security failures: unauthorized external actions and exposure of sensitive plaintext inside the runtime before any final output check can intervene. Existing defenses usually protect one boundary, either the planner/runtime or the action sink, and therefore do not by themselves secure both surfaces. We present SecureClaw, a dual-boundary architecture that places authorization at the effect sink and plaintext confinement at the read boundary. Sensitive reads pass through a trusted gateway that replaces raw values with opaque handles and, in the evaluated deployment, bounded summaries as an explicit declassification interface. Writes that change external state follow a PREVIEW$\rightarrow$COMMIT protocol in which only a trusted executor may commit the exact canonical request authorized by policy. The runtime can still plan over summaries and symbolic references, but cannot directly dereference secrets or perform side effects. Across AgentDojo, AgentLeak, and Agent Security Bench (ASB), SecureClaw is the only defense we evaluate in a common harness that simultaneously retains usable task utility and achieves 0\% attack success rate (ASR) on ASB, 0.64\% ASR on AgentDojo, and 3.23\% overall leak on AgentLeak's attacked parity lane, which measures final-output and internal-relay leakage.
Source availability
PDF linkedThe paper record includes a public PDF URL.
Extraction status
Parse run linkedA document parse run is attached to this paper.
Proof status
unverified0 refs; 3 sources; 50% coverage.
What was readable
Derived fallback: Estimated from adjacent evidence; not verified from source.
Viability
Time to MVP
Commercial
Export
Preparing verified analysis
Dimensions overall score 0.0
PROBLEM
Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents face two distinct security failures: unauthorized external actions and exposure of sensitive plaintext inside the runtime before any final output check can intervene.
METHOD
Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents face two distinct security failures: unauthorized external actions and exposure of sensitive plaintext inside the runtime before any final output check can intervene. Existing defenses usually protect one boundary, either the planner/...
RESULT
ScienceToStartup currently rates this 0.0/10 on the public viability pass. Across AgentDojo, AgentLeak, and Agent Security Bench (ASB), SecureClaw is the only defense we evaluate in a common harness that simultaneously retains usable task utility and achieves 0\% attack success...
WHY NOW
Uncategorized moved forward this cycle; last verified June 2026. Public score 0.0/10.
{"file name": "input.pdf", "number of pages": 26, "author": "Yuhan Ma; Stefan Schmid", "title": "SecureClaw: Clawing Back Control of LLM Agents", "creation date": null, "modification date": null, "kids": []}
Implication not extracted yet.
partial
Paper-native neighborhood for concepts, methods, materials, markets, and competitors. Missing lanes stay labeled instead of disappearing behind commercialization gates.
Concepts
Methods
Materials
Markets
Competitors
No named competitor graph is public yet; the page still exposes the segment, adoption evidence, and score state so the commercial read is not blank.
Segment
Uncategorized
Adoption evidence
No public code link in the paper record yet
Commercial read
0.0/10 public viability
Direct
Adjacent
Substitute
Unknown
No indexed public discussion is attached to 2606.09549 yet. That is a visibility signal, not a blank module: the monitor is watching the public channels below.
Hacker News
Not indexed yet
Not indexed yet
Bluesky
Not indexed yet
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Reference metadata is not materialized in the public index yet. The source PDF remains the authority; cache refresh is optional.
CITED BY
No citing papers are indexed in the public S2S graph yet. This is an explicit zero-signal state, not a hidden lookup.
Foundation
Extension
Commercially relevant
Owned Distribution
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2/3 checks · 67%
Build Passport
Build passport pending - Proof Lab budget No verified cost estimate / $7.00 cap
status
missing
reason
passport_row_missing
proof status
unverified
cost/budget
No verified cost estimate
confidence low
next verification path
Build brief missing until Build Passport data exists.
Source missing: Build Passport payload.
Experiment plan missing until prototype path is available.
No prototype path attached.
Validation checklist missing until required assets, cost, and regulatory flags are verified.
No checklist artifact is attached to the Build Passport payload.
Derived signals show verified:false until source-backed receipts exist.
Evidence coverage
OpportunityKernel evidence_receipt
0 refs / 3 sources / 50% coverage
fresh
Verify missing sources before using this as buyer proof. verified:false
Build readiness
BuildPassport EvidenceState
passport absent
fresh
Run Proof Lab or inspect typed missing state. verified:false
Artifact maturity
GitHub and Hugging Face maturity payloads
No public artifact surface observed
fresh
Open source artifacts or mark the gap as missing. verified:false
Technical feasibility
partial
Current read
Runnable path is not fully verified.
Evidence
No Build Passport payload attached.
Gaps
Next test
Run minimal reproduction from the Build Passport prototype path.
Market urgency
missing
Current read
Buyer urgency is not verified from source.
Evidence
0 references, 3 sources, 50% evidence coverage.
Gaps
Next test
Collect buyer interview, deployment evidence, or cited demand signal.
Buyer clarity
missing
Current read
No budget owner is verified for this paper.
Evidence
Build tab has no CRM, procurement, or operator source.
Gaps
Next test
Map target operator, economic buyer, and procurement trigger.
Defensibility
missing
Current read
Defensibility signals are missing.
Evidence
No defensibility receipt attached.
Gaps
Next test
Refresh defensibility bars with source receipts.
Integration burden
missing
Current read
No public implementation surface observed.
Evidence
No GitHub or Hugging Face payload attached.
Gaps
Next test
Write integration checklist from prototype path and target workflow.
Capital intensity
missing
Current read
No observed cost estimate is verified.
Evidence
Cost passport has no observed_usd value.
Gaps
Next test
Run cost passport or mark the cost field not applicable.
Regulatory load
missing
Current read
No regulatory classification is attached.
Evidence
Build Passport ledger does not include regulatory flags.
Gaps
Next test
Classify regulatory flags before commercialization planning.
No named scientific founder assigned.
Paper authors are not treated as operators without consent.
People
No named person assigned.
Gaps
Next verification path
Prototype owner missing.
Build Passport does not name an implementer.
People
No named person assigned.
Gaps
Next verification path
Operator workflow not sourced.
No buyer or workflow interview attached.
People
No named person assigned.
Gaps
Next verification path
No GTM owner verified.
No CRM or outreach source attached.
People
No named person assigned.
Gaps
Next verification path
Regulatory need unclassified.
No clinical or regulatory source attached.
People
No named person assigned.
Gaps
Next verification path
ARTIFACTS
No public artifacts yet.
DEFENSIBILITY
Defensibility and confidence evidence pending.
WATCHTOWER
No verified watchtower monitor rows yet.
FORESIGHT
No prediction yet — minted on next Foresight batch.
OPPORTUNITYKERNEL CHANGES SINCE LAST VIEW
No verified OpportunityKernel changes since the last view.
COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE UPDATES
No verified competitive landscape changes yet.
RELATED PAPER UPDATES
No verified related paper changes yet.
SIGNAL CANVAS HISTORY AND DELTAS
No Signal Canvas history deltas yet.
TIMELINE
Save this paper to start tracking momentum - commits, demos, and score changes appear here.
No tracked events yet.
Score trend will appear after multiple data points.
BUZZ
Buzz trend pending.